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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL CHRISTENSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Civil No. 15574

WELDON S. ABBOTT,

Defendant-Respondent,

RESPONDENT Is BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Appellant Christensen sued to enforce payment of
the $111,000 promissory note of Defendant-Respondent Abbott and
sought to recover $37,200 for the care for 200 head of Angus
cattle, which had been purchased by Abbott from Christensen
and which were involved in the joint ranching operation of the
parties.
Respondent Abbott pleaded as an affirmative defense an
accord and satisfaction, which settled all accounts between the
parties which involved their joint ranching venture.

Both par-

ties admitted the joint venture being constituted by (1) the
Abbott to Christensen note for the black Angus cattle purchase,
and (2) the joint Christensen-Abbott purchase and operation of
the Haslem ranch and other red cattle.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen,
without a jury.

The court found that the Christensen-Abbott

business venture had failed and that on April 28, 1976 the parties had entered into an accord and satisfaction agreement,
which covered a division of all property and debts of the joint
venture.

The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with pre-

judice for no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the judgment of the trial court after trial
in this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's state~ent of facts is confusing and arg~enta
tive.

Respondent sets forth this statement of relevant facts

and the proofs of those facts as was made by both parties before the trial court, in accordance with the fundamental principle
that respondent is entitled to every reasonable inference from
chose facts which support the findings and judgment of the trial
court.
The Christensen-Abbott joint venture involved two separate
business transactions, 11ith a continuing joint ranching operation.

First, on March 6. 1974, Abbott purchased from Christens~

200 black Angus cattle.

Abbott received a bill-of-sale (Exh.P-14

and gave to Christensen his pro~issory note for $111,000 (Exh.P-1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Then, in April, 1974, Christensen and Abbott purchased
the Haslem Blue Mountain Ranch with 250 red cattle for $703,500.
The initial payment was $173,500, of which Christensen paid
$85,000 and Abbott paid $88,500 with the understanding with the
Haslems that the cattle were to be considered as fully paid for
(R-40) .

The balance of the purchase price was represented by

the Christensen-Abbott promissory note to the Haslems for
$529,500, payable in annual installments over ten years (Exh.P-35).
The parties jointly received a bill-of-sale for the Haslem cattle
(Exh.P-10), and Christensen immediately gave to Abbott a bill-ofsale for the same cattle (Exh.P-11).
The Angus cattle and the Haslem cattle were all placed on
the Haslem ranch and

BL~

range land, under the operation of

Christensen, until April, 1976.

It was agreed between Christensen

and Abbott that they would each take half of the calf crop (R-168).
The Haslems sued Christensen and Abbott to foreclose the
delinquent mortgage (R-202,242), and in April, 1976 it became
apparent to Christensen and Abbott that their ranching venture
was a failure.

They then agreed to conclude the joint venture

and to settle their accounts, with the 250 red cattle being
split, with 44 to Abbott and the remainder to Christensen, with
an assignment to Abbott by Christensen of the latter's interest
in the Haslem contract and an assumption by Abbott of the Haslem
mortgage, including the delinquencies of $193,187.95 (Exh.P-35),
less $20,000 paid on interest, or $173,187.95, plus accrued
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interest.

The Haslem assignment and assumption instrument

(Exh.P-4) was prepared by Dennis Draney, the law partner of
George Mangan, Christensen's attorney (R-291).

Draney and

Mangan each admitted (R-292,294) having a joint financial
interest in the Haslem ranch, as they had contributed about
$45,000 toward Christensen's part of the purchase down payment
(R-294,295).
The foregoing is a recital of admitted facts.

The contro-

versy arises from the conflicting testimony of the parties as
to their intention with respect to the Haslem red cattle, the
black Angus cows, the assignment and assumption agreement (Exh.
P-4), and the arrangement of the parties with regard to operation of the Haslem ranch.
Abbott's testimony was that the parties always intended
to own the ranch jointly, but that the 250 head of cattle purchased therewith were to be property of Abbott and that in the
operation of the Haslem property Christensen was to pay all
costs of feeding and pasturing the cattle and to furnish all
labor therefor (R-239) , and in return he was to receive and did
in fact receive the proceeds of one-half of the calf crop
(R-146, 155, 156 and 164).

Abbott testified that the purpose

and intent of the parties in the execution of the Haslem
contract

"Assignment and Assumption Agreement" (Exh.P-L..) was

not only that he assume and pay the note in favor of Haslem,
including all arrearages of interest, but also that his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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promissory note to Christensen (Exh.P-1) would be cancelled
and Abbott would own outright the 200 head of Angus cows (R-241243).

This settlement was in consideration of the liabilities

assumed by Abbott and further in consideration of the fact that
Abbott received only 44 of the 250 head of cattle purchased
with the Haslem property, and made certain payments to Christensen.
(Exhs. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9; R-239-40)
Christensen testified that the agreement for operation of
the Haslem ranch was that the parties were to be joint owners
of the ranch and all of the cattle purchased therewith; that
the parties were to share equally in all of the ranching expenses
incident to grazing the cattle and were to share equally in the
calf crop (R-168).

In addition, Christensen testified that he

was to receive a wage for managing the Haslem property (R-179).
Christensen testified that the purpose and intent of the assignment and assumption agreement (Exh.P-4) was only to settle the
rights of the parties in the real property and their obligations
under the note and mortgage, and he admitted that Abbott was to
assume and pay all of the arrearages, both principal and interest,
on the Haslem note (R-202,203).

Christensen said that Abbott

would be liable for one-half of all of the costs incurred in
feeding and grazing the cattle during the time the parties were
in possession of the Haslem ranch (R-202,203).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The evidence adduced by Christensen at the trial purports
to show the total amounts expended in the joint ranching operation and the reasonableness of such expenditures.

The expenses

are not broken down as to the Angus cows and the other joint
operations.
After a two-day trial, Judge Sorensen gave a memorandum
decision (R-40), stating:
It would appear that, no matter what the
business arrangement was between the
parties prior to April 28, 1976, on that
date both parties concluded the business
had failed, and they therefore settled
between them a division of the property
and debts. The court finds that Exhibit 4
covers only a part of that settlement.
The court concludes that on April 28, 1976,
there was an accord and satisfaction, and
therefore finds no cause of action.
The findings (R-41) and judgment (R-43) concluded that
there was an accora and satisfaction, which settled between the
parties a division of the property and the debts of their business operation.

Christensen's complaint for recovery on the

$111.000 note and for care of the Angus cattle was dismissed.
By the terms of the accord and satisfaction Abbott was to
receive the 200 Angus cows and 44 head of the Haslem cows.

The

court necessarily concluded that Christensen was entitled to
recover nothing for care and feeding prior to April 28, 1976,
since the accord and satisfaction adjusted all accounts between
the parties.

Christensen wrongfully refused to deliver the 200

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Angus cows to Abbott after April 28, 1976, and could not recover
costs or services incurred because of his wrongful refusal to
make delivery.

ARGUMENT
The only issue before this court is whether there was sufficient credible evidence to support the trial judge's finding
that there had been an accord and satisfaction between the parties, which settled and divided the properties and debts of the
joint Christensen-Abbott ranching operation.
Appellant has attempted to obscure the issue by his confusing recital of details of the ranching operation, all of
which were resolved in the final settlement between the parties.
The only writing involved in the settlement; that is, the
assignment by Christensen and assumption of the Haslem contract
by Abbott, was an instrument of transfer and as such it was
only a part of the whole settlement agreement.

Abbott's note

to Christensen and any difference in what he did pay and what
he might have owed for care of his Angus cattle were the only
matters on which Christensen sued, and these matters were resolved by the whole final settlement.

These were the trial

court's findings after a two-day trial, where the details of
the ranching operation and the procedure in settlement were
fully examined.
tr~ditional

The review by this court should give the

respect to the trial court's findings after trial.
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POINT I.
A COMPLETE, COMPREHENSIVE ACCORD AND SA TISFACTION DIVIDING ALL OF THE PROPERTIES AND
THE DEBTS OF THE JOINT VENTURE WAS MADE AND
EXECUTED BY THE PARTIES.
The Utah court in Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society (1937), 94 U.532, 72 P2d 1060, reh.den. 94 U.570, 80
P2d 348, cited at 1 Am.Jur.2d 301, defined an accord and satisfaction as:
An accord is an agreement between parties,

one to give or perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment or
performance in satisfaction of a claim.
The "satisfaction" is the consu=ation of
such agreement. There must be consideration for the agreement. Settlement of an
tmliquidated or disputed claim where the
parties are apart in good faith presents
such consideration.
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc. (1977) (Utah),
560 P2d 1383, 1386. citing to 1 Am.Jur.2d 301-302, gave this
definition:
An accord and satisfaciton is a method of

discharging a contract, or settling a
claim arising from a contract, by substituting for such contract or claim an agreement thereof, and the execution of the
substituted agreement.
Smoot v. Checketts (1912), 41 U.211, 125 P.412, held that
an accord and satisfaction is established, with good consideration, where the debtor pays and the creditor accepts less than
the full amount due on a disputed or unliquidated claim.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart
417

Inc. (1966), 18 U2d 186,

P2d 761, restated the definition of accord and satisfaction

as in Browning, supra, and then reviewed the evidence before
the trial court and affirmed that court's conclusion that the
cashing of a check marked "payment in full" did not by itself
constitute an accord.
A series of Utah cases, including Bennett, supra, placed
the burden of pleading and proof of accord and satisfaction on
the party raising that affirmative defense.
The Utah court in Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan
Association (1938), 94 U.97, 75 P2d 669, reaffirmed the Browning
and Smoot cases, supra, and held that the party pleading an
accord and satisfaction had the burden of proving that defense.
Hintze v. Seaich (1968), 20 U2d 275, 437 P2d 202, held that
the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction must be
pleaded and proved by a preponderance of evidence.

In Hintze

there was no pleading of that affirmative defense, only an
answer disputing the commission due under an oral employment
agreement, and the court followed the Bennett case, in holding
that the cashing of a check marked "payment in full" was not
alone sufficient proof of a meeting of minds for an accord and
satisfaction.
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co. (1975)(Utah)
535 P2d 1228, again involved a question of whether the debtor
in cashing a check for less than the full amount alleged due

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constituted an acceptance for an accord and satisfaction agreement.

The court placed the burden of proof on the party alleging

the accord and satisfaction, citing to Hintze, supra.

In Tates,

the trial court found that there was no acceptance by the debtor
of the lesser amount and thus no accord or satisfaction.

The

court, citing to !1emmott v. U.S. Fuel Co. (1969), 22 U2d 356,
453 P2d 155, stated:

On appeal we apply the traditional rules
of review: we assume that the trial
court believed those aspects of the evidence which may be deemed to support his
finding and judgment; and we survey the
evidence in the light favorable thereto.
Cannon, supra, is the most recent Utah accord and satisfaction

23Se

There the Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court's ruling that cashing a check for a lesser amount than
due on an employment contract was not proof of an accord and
satisfaction, citing to the Tates and Hintze cases, supra.
The Utah cases have consistently held that the sufficiency
of evidence of an agreement and the credibility of witnesses
are the prerogatives of the trial court.

In Paulsen v. Coombs

(1953), 123 U.49, 253 P2d 621, the trial court was affirmed in
finding that the party with the burden of proof had

~et

that

burden, citing Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Company
(1952), 122 U.268, 248 P2d 692, and saying:
The question of whether evidence is
sufficient to be clear and convincing
is primarily for the trial court; his
finding should not be disturbed unless
we must say as a matter of law that no
one could reasonably find the evidence
to be clear and convincing.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co. (1958), 8 U2d
226, 332 P2d 666, the Utah court states:
The traditional and well established
rule is: the fact trier, in this
instance the jury, has the prerogative
of judging credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given the evidence.
Let us now apply the Utah case law to the Christensen v.
Abbott facts and trial.

The single issue of fact and law was

pleaded by respondent in his affirmative defense of accord and
satisfaction (R-7).

The two-day trial was entirely devoted to

proofs by respondent and rebuttal by appellant of respondent's
allegation of accord and satisfaction.

The trial court's

finding, after hearing all of the evidence, was that there was
an accord and satisfaction agreement between the parties (R-40),
thus concluding that respondent had met his burden of proof.
If there were any variance in the evidence, the trial court
weighed that evidence and the credibility of the witnesses in
finding for respondent.
Appellant's statement of facts admits that two separate
transactions made up the present dispute, these being (1) the
Abbott purchase of the 200 black Angus cattle in consideration
for Abbott's note to Christensen for $111,000 and (2) the
Abbott-Christensen purchase of the Haslem ranch and red cattle,
with the joint operation of these properties by Christensen.
The proof was that the black Angus and the red Haslem
cattle were all run on the Haslem ranch and on BLH winter and
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summer ranges, depending on the season (R-276).

The expenses

of the whole operation were summarized by appellant in his
accounting summaries(Exhs. P-31,32 and 33).
A reading of the trial transcript shows complete and utter
confusion, prolixity and prolifera of testimony regarding black
and red cows.

Judge Sorensen commented near the end of the

trial that the case had not proceeded in an orderly manner, and
counsel agreed (R-283).

Judge Sorensen asked Christensen if

"your business venture had flopped," if the business arrangement
came to an end then, and if it were being wound up on April 28
(1976), and Christensen agreed (R-304).
Abbott testified that in the settlement of the joint ranching venture the distinction between black and red cows was not
important and that the ranch equity and debts and all cattle,
black or red, were considered by the parties in arriving at
their settlement agreement (R-255,285).
The trial court's Memorandum Decision (R-40) states:
It would appear that, no matter what the
business arrangement was between the parties
prior to April 28, 1976, on that date both
parties concluded the business had failed,
and they therefore settled between them a
division of the property and debts. The
court finds that Exhibit 4 covers only a
part of that settlement.
The court concludes that on April 28, 1976,
there was an accord and satisfaction, and
therefore finds no cause of action.
We submit that respondent proved an accord and satisfaction, with settlement of all disputed transactions between the
parties, by competent and credible evidence and testimony and
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that the trial court's decision was entirely consistent with
all of the Utah case law cited above.
POINT II.
THE HASLEN CONTRAC:' ASSIGNMENT AND ASSill1PTION AGREE!-fENT INSTRUMENT HAS ONE FACET ONLY
OF THE COMPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
A. THAT DOCill!ENT WAS NOT INTENDED BY THE PARTIES AS AN
INTEGRATED OR FINAL AGREEHENT.
The record and trial transcript show that the ChristensenAbbott joint venture, from its inception through its operation
by Christensen to its conclusion, was loosely and ineptly handled,
with a bare minimum of writings to document it (R-136), with
great faith and trust by Abbott (R-242,243).
Appellant argues in Points III and IV of his brief that the
Haslem contract Assignment and Assumption Agreement dated April 28,
1976 (Exh.P-4) was a final, complete, integrated contract; that
parol evidence should not have been allmved to vary that writing;
thus allowing appellant to come around at a later date to sue on
the black Angus separate note.
Respondent agrees with the general rule that a completely
incegrated agreement or final memorandum cannot generally be
varied by parol evidence.

This rule is spelled out in the numer-

ous cases cited by appellant; particularly, State Bank of Lehi v.
\~oolsey

(1977) (Utah) 525 P2d 602, and Rainford v. Rytting (1969)

22 U/.d 252, 451 P2d 769 and Lamb v. Bangart (1974)(Utah) 525 P2d 602.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bullfrog l1arina, Inc. v. Lentz (1972) 28 U2d 261, 501 P2d
266, addresses the real and only issue now before this court;
that is, what is a final, complete, integrated writing?

The

court answered this saying:
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing
that is before the court is an integration
and asks the application of the parol evidence rule, the court must determine as a
question of fact whether the parties did
in fact adopt a particular writing or
writings as the final and complete expression of their bargain. In determining the
issue of the completeness of the integration in writing, evidence extrinsic to the
writing itself is admissible. Parol testimony is admissable to show the circumstances
under which the agreement was ~ade and the
purpose for which the instrument was executed.
In Bullfrog Marina the trial court's determination, that a
lease, a separate employment contract and other evidence of the
parties' whole intention should all be considered together, was
affirmed.
Abbott testified as to his understanding of the settlement
of the entire joint ranching operation, with execution of the
Haslem contract assignment and assumption agreement

(~xh.P-4)

as one part of the whole (R-241), and he testified as to the
execution of that document as follo>lS (R-242,243):
A

this day this was the final day before
foreclosure on the Blue !!ountain Ranch and an
injunction against Paul and I, you know, for
the whole thing.
I came out to Duchesne, went
and talked to Paul and took him the papers to
sign to settle the whole thing, and those
papers had been prepared by you to deed everything over to me, and we agreed about the
On
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division. He was to take half the cows,
I got half the cows, and that canceled the
note, and I gave those to him and he said,
he had to go see George Hangan before he
would sign anything. George was his partner on the Blue Hountain Ranch. He put
in forty thousand dollars.
A

Yes. And so I gave him (Christensen) the
papers and he went to l!r. Hangan' s office
in Roosevelt and then I went to Roosevelt
and waited there about three hours, and
then he came back with this.
(Indicating)
THE COURT:

A

By "this" you

!lEaii.

Exhibit 4?

Exhibit 4, yes, sir. And brought it up, and
I looked at this and, you kno~v, our previous
full agreement had been I would take over
those payments of the one hundred three
thousand one year, the sixty-eight thousand
the next year, and the half of about another
thirty-five thousand back payments, fifty-six
thousand dollars of back interest and thirtyeight thousand of current interest, and in
settling this out he would--and all this was
to apply on that note or my half of the cows.
I got two hundred and he got t~vo hundred. The
color didn't make any difference. He was taking
the red ones, so the black ones were then mine,
and he was supposed to tear up the note. But
this wasn't put in this thing. So Mr. Draney
brought it in and handed this to me and said
that, "Your la~vyer said you were supposed to
sign this." And I looked at it, and, of course,
read it through and saw that I was assigning
them the Haslem cattle, which is fine, but I
was getting the black ones which they didn't
put in, and I said to Paul at that time, "~low
I ~.;ill go ahead and sign this thing if you
will simply go ahead and keep our oral agreement and let me have the black cows and tear
up that note and no more tricks." And he said,
"Fine." So I signed it.
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Dennis Draney testified that he was the law partner of
George Mangan, appellant's attorney, in 1976 (R-292); that he
prepared the Haslem contract assignment and assumption instrument for Christensen; and that he delivered the instrument to
Abbott for his execution (R-291).

At that point in the trial,

Judge Sorensen asked George Mangan if he had a financial interest in the Christensen-Abbott operation, and
in the affirmative (R-292).

~Iangan

answered

Draney then admitted that he had

a financial interest in the Haslem ranch because of his membership in an investment club with Eangan (R-294).

Draney then

testified that about $45,000 or $50,000 had been borrowed by
the club for a down payment on the Haslem ranch deal (R-294,295).
The Haslem contract "Assignment and Assumption Agreement"
(Exh. P-4) was clearly and simply an instrument of transfer of
purchaser Christensen's interest in the Haslem real property and
44 head of cattle to Abbott, with assumption by Abbott of the
obligations under the Haslem contract.
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee (1957) 6 U2d 98,
306 P2d 773, and Mathis v. Madsen (1953) 1 U2d 46, 261 P2d 952,
both hold that the intent of parties to an agreement should be
ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument itself,
second from other contemporaneous writings concerning the same
subject matter, and third from extrinsic
intentions.

parol evidence of the

Under the rule of those Utah cases, the Haslem

contract "Assignment and Assumption Agreement" must be
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construed from the language within the four corners of that
document as a simple instrument of transfer.
The testimony of Abbott as set out above (R-241-243) clearly
shows his intention and understanding that there was no complete
or integrated writing which finalized the whole ranching operation settlement.

Christensen agreed with Judge Sorensen's sum-

marization that on April 28, 1976 the business arrangement came
to an end, the "business venture flopped" and it was being wound
up then (R-304).
Continental Bank v. Bybee, supra, involved a situation
where the attorney who drafted the questioned agreement was also
a party to it.

The Utah court held that under such circumstances

the proper construction of the instrument should be strictly
against him.

c~trued

Guinand v. Walton (1969) 22 U2d 196, 450 P2d 467,

held that a document drawn up by defendants through their attorney
had to be strictly construed against defendants.
~

(1972) 27 U2d 169, 493 P2d 1003 held:

Skousen v.

"It is axiomatic

that language in a written instrument is interpreted more strongly
against a scrivener who evecutes it."
The Haslem contract

"Assignment and Assumption Agreement;'

was prepared by Dennis Draney, the law partner of Christensen's
attorney, and both Draney and George Hangan admitted having very
substantial financial interests in the Haslem ranch purchase
with Christensen.

Certainly that instrument must be construed

strictly as to what it really was; that is, an instrument of
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Now I will go ahead and sign this thing
if you will simply go ahead and keep our
oral agreement and let me have the black
cows and tear up that note and no more
tricks. And he said, 'Fine.' So I signed it.
No objection was made to this testimony.

The transcript

is devoid of any objection by appellant to any testimony or
evidence on the ground of varying any writing by parol evidence.
Pettingill v. Perkins (1954) 2 U2d 266, 272 P2d 185, held:
Generally, appellate courts will not review
a ground of objection not urged in the trial
court. 3 Am.Jur.ll6, Appeal and Error, 381.
The duty is incumbent upon counsel to give
the trial court the opportunity to correct
the error before asking the appellate court
to reverse a verdict and judgment thereon.
Pettingill was followed, and the language quoted above was
approved, in Steele v. \.Jilkinson (1960) 10 U2d 159, 349 P2d 1117,
and Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corp. (1964) 15 U2d 318,
392 P2d 620.
Appellant's arguments in Points III and IV of his brief
are raised for the first time on this appeal, which is improper,
and those arguments cannot now be heard.
POINT III.
SATISFACTIOil OF THE ABBOTT TO CHRISTENSEN
BLACK ANGUS NOTE WAS ONE OTHER FACET OF THE
CONPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Appellant's com?laint (R-1) sought (1) recovery on the
$111,000 Abbott to Christensen note on the purchase by Abbott
of the 200 black An3us cattlE:, (2) costs of care of those same
cattle by Christensen, and (3) recovery of $5,000 for BLM
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grazing fees paid by Christensen as an expense of the Haslem
ranch operation.

Appellant has obviously abandoned his third

cause for relief, as he has not pursued it in this appeal.
Respondent's answer to each of appellant's alleged causes for
relief was the full accord and satisfaction, which required consideration and inclusion of the note, all joint ranching operation expenses and the Haslem ranch equity and obligations. Und&
this Point III respondent will limit argument to the matter of
the note as a part of the whole settlement, and under Point IV
the costs of black Angus care will be considered.
Foreclosure on the Haslem ranch mortgage was immediately
impending on April 28, 1976, and Abbott testified (R-241) that
for him to assume the Haslem obligations "the note was to be
torn up."

His testimony at R-242 and 243 is quoted in full

under Point II A. ,

~vhere

he said unequivocally that for him to

make final settlement and assume the debts the note was to be
cancelled.
In assuming the delinquencies on the Haslem mortgage,
Abbott had to immediately make the payment due on January l,
1975 of $125,027.95, the payment due on January l, 1976 of
$68,160.00 (Exh. P-35) and interest to April 28, 1976 of
$8,753.32, less $20,000, which had been paid on interest (R-213),
or a total delinquencies of $181,941.27.

As consideration for

this debt assumption and as part of the whole settlement, Abbott
was to have cancellation of the $111,000 note, with a division
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of the red Haslem cattle, with 44 to Abbott and the remainder
of 250, or 206, to Christensen (R-242).

During the ranch

operation, Abbott had paid $11,945 (Exhs. 5,6,7,8 and 9).
Abbott testified that these payments were intended to apply on
the note, although a check to Les Herman for $4,445 (Exh.5) was
marked for hay (R-114,115,135).

Christensen testified that the

same five payments were to apply on purchase of hay for the
joint venture (R-171).
Abbott emphatically denied that the Haslem ranch assignment
and assumption (Exh. P-4) applied solely to the Haslem deal in
the final settlement (R-116), and he continued to show that his
assumption of the Haslem delinquencies and continuing obligation
more than satisfied the note in the final settlement (R-117).
After the final settlement on April 28, no demand was made
by Christensen on Abbott on the note until the present suit was
commenced on July 23, 1976 for the full $111,000 and interest
(R.-249).
The obvious complete lack of current accounting or documentation by the parties, and particularly by Christensen who
was the operator during the ranch operation for tvlO years, as
demonstrated during the two-day trial, with a total mishmash of
testimony, caused Judge Sorensen to conclude in his Memorandum
Decision (R-40) :
It vmuld appear that, no matter what the
business arrangement was between the parties
prior to April 28, 1976, on that date_both
parties concluded the business had fa~led,
and they therefore settled bet"\veen them a
division of the property and debts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The trial court's finding that the $111,000 note was satisfied as part of the whole settlement must be affirmed as require(
by the general rule for appellate review.

The Utah court in

Paulsen v. Coombs, supra, held:
The question of whether evidence is sufficient to be clear and convincing is primarily
for the trial court; his finding should not
be disturbed unless we must say as a matter
of law that no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.
POINT IV.
ANY MONEY OWING BY ABBOTT TO CHRISTENSEN
FOR CARE OF ANY CATTLE HAS SETTLED AND
SATISFIED AS A PART OF THE C0!1PLETE
ACCORD AND SATISFACTIOU.
The second cause of action in appellant's complaint (R-1)
was

h~s

claim for $37,200, limited to care of Abbott's 200 black

Angus cattle from l1arch, 1974 to July 4, 1976.

Appellant pro-

ceeded by Order to Show Cause (R-16) to enforce an agistor's
lien, asking sale of ::he black Angus cattle and their calves.
The parties thereafter stipulated that those cattle should be
sold under direction of Abbott, with the sale proceeds to be
deposited in a joint bank account and to be released only on
order of the court (R-35).

The sale was made, and the proceeds

of sale were deposited in such joint bank account.

The judg-

ment of the trial court (R-43) awarded the proceeds of the bank
account to Abbott.
Abbott testified that the operation of the ranch was entire!
pursuant to oral agreements, whereby Christensen would run all
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of the cattle, black and red, and would pay all expenses of
operation and in return would receive one-half of the calf crop
(R-239,259), and that Christensen did in fact receive his share
of the calves (R-146,155,156 and 164).

Christensen testified

that he received one-half of the calf crop (R-185) from both
black Angus and red Haslem cattle (R-172), and that the expenses,
including wages, were to be equally split (R-168,200).
Christensen's complaint is a claim for care for only the
200 black Angus.

Christensen's proof of operating expenses

paid by him went to the total operation (Exhs. P-31, P-32 and
D-33), without any proof of actual expenses for care of the
black Angus.

Christensen testified then that one-half of the

expenses '"ere his (R-ll9 ,120), thus oaking his proof entirely
inconsistent with his claim.
After two days of this prolifera of testimony, the trial
court found that on April 28, 1976 "the parties settled and
agreed between themselves to a division of the property and
the debts of said business operation," and then concluded that
"there was an accord and satisfaction between the parties"
(R-41) .
Appellant complains in Point V of his brief that Judge
Sorensen did not r.Jake detailed findings "of the necessary
elements" of the accord and satisfaction.
the interest of K.D.S.

In State of Utah in

(1978)(Utah) 587 P2d 9, Judge Ellett

answered a contention that insufficient findings of fact and
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Conclusions of LaH had been entered by the trial court, citing
to In re Clift's Estate, 70 U.409, 260 P.859, and saying:
7he test for Rule 52(a) is whether or not
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law indicate clearly the mind of the
court even though they are not in the
artistic form of approved models.
Hojave Uranium Co. v. Hesa Petroleum Co. (1969) 22 U.2d 239,
451 P.2d 587, involved a problem of "elusiveness of the record,"
like in the instant case, where the trial court did not make
detailed findings or conclusions.

The Utah court stated:

This court, in many cases has indulsed
the ;:>resumption that where the trial
court did not make a specific finding on
a particular phase of a case, that if
such finding had been made it would be
in harmony with the decision rendered.
Probably the best statement of this
proposition was made by t!r. Justice
Wade in lfower '1. t1cCarthy .122 Utah 1, 245
P. 2d 224 (1952), ~•here it was stated
that, 'In reviewing a case of this kind
where issues of fact are involved and
there are no findings of fact, we do
not review the facts but assume that the
trier of the facts found them in accord
with its decision, and we affirm the
decision if from the evidence it would
be reasonable to find facts to support it.'
Judge Sorensen had before him a conflict of testimony as
to the basic ranch operating arrangement, a dispute as to where
and in what amounts payments by Abbott had or should have been
applied; that is, on the An8us note or on ranch operations, and
a disagreeoent as to which cattle, red or black, were intended
to be divided on the final settlement.

The parties were in

agreement that a final settlement of the entire ranch operation
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was intended and in fact was

cons~ated

on April 28, 1976.

The trial court's findings and judgment must be affirmed.
POIHT V.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGHENT
SHOULD BE RESPECTED ON APPELLATE REVIEH

The rule of respect for the trial court's findings and
conclusions on appellate review is last

firmly~ated

by the Utah

court in Fisher v. Taylor (1977)(Utah) 572 P.2d 393:
This Court has consistently followed
the well-recognized standard of appellate
review which precludes the substitution
of our judgment for that of the trial
court on issues of fact, and where its
findings and judgment are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence
we 1vill not disturb them.
In

Wash-A-~1atic

v. Rupp (l975)(Utah) 532 P.2d 682, in a

case involving contradictory evidence of the parties to a sales
contract, the Utah court said:
The evidence was sufficient to sustain
the judgment made, and we should sustain the trial court even if we might
have come to a different decision had
r.ve been trying the matter.
The Utah court has always followed the general rule of the
Memmott case, supra, under Point I, that on appeal the evidence
before the trial court must be reviewed in the light most favorable to sustain the findings of the trial court.

This is the

consistent holding of the Utah court in the Page, Northcrest, Inc.
and Paulsen cases, cited supra by respondent in Point I.

The
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Utah court said in Prudential Federal Savings v. Hartford Ace. &
Ind. Co.

(1958) 7 U2d

366, 325 P2d 899:

Inasmuch as the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs, they are
entitled to have us review the evidence
and every reasonable inference fairly
to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to them.
Judge Sorensen heard two days of detailed testimony and had
the full opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses
and of their testimony.

His ultimate findings and judgment was

that there was a complete accord and satisfaction between the
parties, and he dismissed appellant's attempt to renege on that
agreement.

The trial court's findings and judgment must be

affirmed
CONCLUSION
The only issue before this court is whether there was
sufficient, competent and credible evidence to support the trial
court's findings that there had been an accord and satisfaction
between the parties, which settled and divided the properties
and debts of the joint ranching venture.
The trial court's findings and judgment, after a two-day
trial, were that the parties had been in a joint business venture, which had failed; that on April 28, 1976 the parties settled between themselves a division of the property and debts
of the ranching operation, thus constituting an accord and
satisfaction; and that Christensen had no cause of action
against Abbott on the black Angus note or for care of those
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particular cattle, whereas those matters were merged in the
accord and satisfaction.
The trial court's findings and judgment must be respected
and affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Wallace D. Hur

/

for Respondent
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